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395

In jurisdictions that allow private settlements, "whereby individual
plaintiffs settle out of court, such settlements are not res judicata as to
other stockholders. A voluntary discontinuance of a derivative action in
this manner would not bar a subsequent suit by other stockholders;
however, once a derivative suit is voluntarily discontinued, the same
suit may not be revived by a motion in the cause.30 This rule against
revival was applied in Manufacturer'sMut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson,31
where the New York court refused to reopen a stockholders' suit which
had been privately settled by purchase of the complainant's stock at
seven times the market value with funds of the corporation on whose
behalf the suit had been brought. Although the court stated that the
termination under these circumstances would not bar a new suit by the
corporation, in such a case it may be that the statute of limitations has
32
run.
Settlements, as a compromise to litigation, are generally encouraged
in order to reduce the administrative burdens and expense to the courts
and litigants. The requirement of court approval brings a proposed
settlement out in the open where its fairness may be compared with
the results that might be secured should the case proceed to trial. Generally court approval of these settlements is given by way of a final
decree or judgment;33 however, the effect of an approved settlement
when not rendered in this official form, e.g., the mere notation of the
court's approval upon the record, is uncertain. A recommended method
of clearly resolving questions of law in this area is the enactment of
legislation similar to federal rule 23 but broader in scope. Such legislation should prohibit discontinuance, settlement, or compromise without
court approval, and provide for the finality of court approved settlements,
as well as specify the form in which such approval is to be rendered.
ROBERT N. RANDALL

Covenants Not To Compete
Covenants not to compete are most commonly found in contracts for
the sale of a business or in contracts of employment and have as their
CODE ANN., R. Civ. PROC., Rule 23(c) (1953); Wyo. STAT., R. Civ. PRoc., Rule
23(c) (1959).
'0See generally STEVENS, PRIVATE COR'ORATIONS § 173 (1949).
3125 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d
139 (1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 688, 43 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
"Ibid.; Hornstein, Problems of Procedure it Stockholder's Derivative Suits,
42 CoLum. L. REv. 574, 583 (1942).
"Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Gerith Realty Corp. v.
Normandie Nat'l See. Corp., 215 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 173 F. Supp. 13, 15 (1959) (dictum).
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object protection of the convenantee.' It is the purpose of this Note to
examine the limitations on the validity of such covenants and to consider
what constitutes a breach or interference with rights thereunder.
In addition to the requirements that such covenants be supported
by consideration2 and be in writing,8 our court seems to look only at
the reasonableness 4 of the provisions in determining their validity. The
court in almost every instance when it sets forth the factors it will consider in determining the reasonableness of a covenant includes the time
period as a vital factor. Yet the fact is that in no decision has a covenant
been found to be unreasonable because of too extensive a duration. Of
the eight cases found where the covenant was not upheld, always for
other reasons, the limitation on the duration of the covenants was a certain number of months,5 two years, 6 three years, 7 five' years,8 or ten
years, 9 and in three cases no time period was specified. 10 A similar
range in the length of time the covenants were to last may be found in
those cases where the covenants have been upheld." In cases where the
restriction was either "as long as the covenantee lives" or "as long as the
covenantee continues in business" the court indicated it would interpret
the length of time of the covenant to be co-extensive with the covI "There are several reasons for the growing popularity of such covenants: 1.
The raiding of employee talent by some employers. 2. The increasing business need
to develop technical innovations and keep them secret. 3. Increased spending for

and development." Nation's Business, Oct. 1959, p. 14.
research
2
Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944) ; Teague v. Schaub, 133
N.C. 467, 45 S.E. 765 (1903) ; see generally 17 C.J.S. Comztracts § 260 (1939); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1636 (1937).
3
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (1950); Radio Electronics Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 244 N.C. 114, 92 S.E.2d 664 (1956) ; Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk
& Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1935)
'Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 9 S.E.2d 473 (1939) ; Cowan v. Fairbrother,
118 N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 813 (1896) ; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 240 (1939) ;5 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1636 (1937).
Culp v. Love, 127 N.C. 457, 37 S.E. 476 (1900).
'Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944).
'Comfort Springs v. Burroughs, 217 N.C. 658, 9 S.E.2d 473 (1939).
"Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
' Shute v. Shute, 176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918).
" Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77
S.E.2d 910 (1953) ; Teague v. Schaub, 133 N.C. 468, 45 S.E. 762 (1903) ; Shute v.
Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E 704 (1902).
Time Period (years)
"Covenant Upheld (cases)
No time period.
6 .............................................
Lives of the parties.
2 .............................................
2 .............. ............. .................. 1
4.............................................
4 .................... .......................

2
3

2 ............................................. 5
10
.........
......................
2 .............
1 ................. ........................... 15

1 ........................................

20
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enantor's life span.12

In Shute v. Heath'8 no time limitation was set
out in the contract and the court said, "An indefinite restriction as to
14
duration will not make such contracts void."'
As to a second area of reasonableness, the territorial extent of the
restriction, there is a precedent question. Our court has said, "[T]here
must be a definite limitation as to space; and the reasonableness of such
limitation will depend upon the nature of the business and goodwill
sold."' 5 This raises the questions what standard will be applied to determine if the limitation is definite enough and, if sufficiently definite,
when is the criterion of reasonableness met.
In Shute v. Heath there was a contract for the sale of a manufacturing business which included a restrictive covenant containing a limitation as to "any territory now occupied by them [covenantees] or from
which they [covenantees] secure their patronage." The court held that
this was not a sufficient limitation on the area. The court reasoned that
where the covenantor could not secure patronage in the future is not
something that could be determined at the time the contract was entered
into. It should be noted that the decision rested not on the unreasonableness of the limitation, but on its indefiniteness.
The standard of measurement that has been applied by the court to
determine if the territorial limitation is sufficiently definite is whether
the rules that apply to the description of real estate in deeds have been
satisfied.1 However, the court seems to use two means other than the
actual words of the contract to decide what actually is the extent of the
limitation-namely, implied restrictions and restrictions established by
parol testimony. In Hauser v. Harding'7 the restricting words in the
contract were "the territory surrounding Yadkinville." Though the
territory outside the town could not be identified, the town limits could
be and the court held the contract was not uncertain to this extent and
should be interpreted by implication to mean "within the town limits of
Yadldnville."'I s In Teague z. Schaub'9 the limitation, "If the field [of
2 This raises a problem as to what the court would decide if the covenantee
either died befQre the covenantor or went out of business. It seems unlikely that
the covenantor would be bound for life in either situation. It is submitted that the
court would probably find that the covenantor would be bound for life, if either of
these two events did not transpire during the covenantor's life span.
131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E. 704 (1902).
U Id. at 282, 42 S.E. at 704.
15
Id. at 282, 42 S.E. at 704.
"6 Shute v. Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E. 704 (1902) ; Hauser v. Harding, 126
N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900). But see 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 256 (1939), stating
that by the majority view the criterion is that the contract must be sufficiently
specific
17 to allow a determination of its reasonableness.
Supra note 16.
a See also Wooten v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910), where the court,
expressly following Hauser, said that the territorial limitation "in the town of
Falkland or near enough thereto to interfere with the plaintiff's business," though
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a *medical practice] is not larger then than now," was too indefinite and
thie court refused to imply a restriction. The court reasoned'that this
limitation could relate to receipts from the practice, the number of
patients, or the extent of the territory.20
The court in a recent case2 ' allowed parol testimony to determine
the territorial limits of the restriction "in Lenoir or the territory now
c6vered by him [covenantor]," finding it to cover ten counties. The
court looked to what territory came within the confines of the restrictive
covenant at the time the covenant was made, not at the time of the
litigation. The covenant specified the territory "now covered" by the
Vendor's business and the court found this was not void for indefiniteness of description because the territory could be specifically located by
parol evidence.
Once the territory is found definite enough, the proper conclusion
would seem to be that the primary consideration of the court in determining whether there is a reasonable restraint on territory is whether
the territory is greater than that required to protect the covenantee's
business.22 In Noe v. McDevitt23 the covenant included North and
South Carolina, but the covenantee's business only covered eastern
North Carolina. The court held that the covenant covered too extensive
a territory to be a reasonable protection of the covenantee's business and
was thus void as against public policy. It has been suggested that
a more appropriate remedy could have been reached in
the Noe case
if the court had enforced the contract only as far as the actual needs of
North Carolina instead of
the covenantee's business extended in eastern
24
declaring the whole contract of no effect
The third area in which the test of reasonableness must be met concerns the hardship that may be imposed on the covenantor. Although
the court does not seem to pay particular attention to this factor in
contracts other than contracts of employment, it appears that employment
contracts will be carefully scrutinized to ascertain whether there is any
undue oppression resulting to the covenantor-employee. 25 It should be
indefinite as to any place outside the city, was definite enough if limited to the city

limits.
'p133 N.C. 458, 45 S.E. 762 (1903).
The dissent reasoned that "field" should mean "Roxboro and the adjacent
area" and that the Hauser case should control, so that this should be interpreted to
mean the city limits of Roxboro. The dissent also favored the admission of parol
testimony to determine the extent of the restraint.
"Thompson v. Turner, 245 N.C. 478, 96 S.E.2d 263 (1957).
See Thompson v. Turner, mipra note 21.
28228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
"See Note, 26 N.C.L. Rzv. 402 (1948).
""[T]he English and American courts make a substantial distinction between
the two in administrative practice .... The distinction rests on a substantial basis,
since, in the former class of contracts we deal with the sale of commodities, and in
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noted that when this issue is to be determined the burden of proof is on
the covenantee-employer to establish its reasonableness. 26
There is a difference between the standard of reasonableness applied
to a restrictive covenant in the case of a person in a professional or
executive type job and that applied in the case of an employee. 27 The
reason for the difference is that an employee only has his labor to sell.
If in urgent need of selling he will more probably accede to an unreasonable restriction at the time of his employment without proper thought for
the future than will a person in a professional or executive type job who
is in a better position to guard his own interests and is more capable of
comprehending the after-effects. Consequently, the court seems to
scrutinize less carefully the professional or executive contracts than
common employment contracts in determining whether any undue hardship is placed on the covenantor.
The final factor in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive
covenant is whether the dominant intent of the parties was, in effect, to
oppress the public. In Shute v. Shute28 the court held the covenant
invalid because there was no intent to protect good will, but only an
attempt to divide the territory in order to keep out all competitors, an
object which was said to be against the interests of the public. 9 It
should be noted that as the court seems to have decided that the attempt
to divide the area was present on the face of the contract, it speaks in
terms of the intent present at the time the contract was made as opposed
the latter class with the performance of personal service-altogether different in

substance; and the social and economic imlications are vastly different. . . . Contracts restraining employment are looked upon with disfavor in modern law ....
And they have been held to be prima fade void... [T]he argument against restraint of employment was-and still is-more powerful than those based on the
evils of monopoly incident to restriction in sales contracts." Kadis v. Britt, 224
N.C. 154, 160, 29 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1944). See generally 5 W.LrmIsToN, CONTRACrS
§ 1643 (1937) ; RESTATEUMNT, CoNTcrs § 515, comment b (1932) ; 43 A.L.R.2d

111 (1935).
20 Kadis v. Britt, supra note 25.
27

Sonotone Co. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947)

(contract be-

tween a district manager and a corporation); Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670,
9 S.E.2d 473 (1939)

(contract between two physicians).

176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918). But see Culp v. Love, 127 N.C. 457, 462,
37 S.E. 476, 478 (1900), where the court said: "The intention of the parties [to the
contract] is immaterial." This statement on its face is in conflict with the statement
made by the court in Shute v. Shiite. The intention referred to in the Culp case
was a subjective belief of the parties as to the legal effect of the contract. This
belief is not controlling. The intention referred to in Shiite v. Shiite was the
dominant purpose of the contract. This purpose or object is controlling. Both
cases held that if the object of a contract is found primarily to shut off all competition, not incidentally to do so, then the contract is against -public policy and of no
effect.
2' The court has said it will allow a contract to remain valid, though in part
designed to stifle competition. The covenant must not be solely for that purpose.
Faust v. Rohr, 166 N.C. 187, 81 S.E. 1096 (1914). See generally RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 518 (1932) ; 5 WrLLisToN, CoNTRAcrs § 1648 (1937).
28
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to that at the time of litigation. The court has indicated that it is not
necessary that the effect be a division of land which causes all competitors to keep out as lorig as this is the present intent.
In looking to the intent of a restritive covenant, the court has two
basic considerations, the needs of the public and the nature of the business. In Shute v. Shute the court found the object of the contract was
to divide the territory between the covenantor and the covenantee in
putting up ginning plants. The court said there should be a multiplication of plants according to the needs of the public, and that the public
would be burdened if a competing ginning mill was too distant to make
patronizing it economically feasible; consequently, the number of gins
to be erected should not be restricted by an agreement between the
parties in that line of business8 0 In Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way &
Co., 1 where the covenantor sold his business to a corporation composed
of all the major buyers of fish in a particular area, the court said there
was nothing on the face of the contract showing an intent to prevent
others from engaging in the same business. The court noted the fact
that there were more competitors at the time of the suit than at the time
the contract was made and that the public was getting the benefit from
the ensuing competition.32 In Cowan v. Fairbrother8 the court upheld
an agreement not to publish a competing newspaper in North Carolina.
This seems to have been justified on the ground that "in its very nature
this [agreement] could not seriously affect the public, because there is
free opportunity to establish newspapers, which are largely the product
8' 4
of the individual ability of the editors.
In addition to the discussion of the primary question of what factors
are considered by the court in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant, it is appropriate to consider how or when the question arises. The question usually arises when the covenantee finds the
covenantor, either alone or in association with a third party, competing
with him in spite of the covenant.
8o See generally Breckenridge, Restraint of Trade it North Carolina, 7 N.C.L.
R v. 249 (1929).
"169 N.C. 679, 86 S.E. 603 (1915).
"The dissent reasoned the contract on its face was designed to monopolize the
entire market. The basic question for the dissent was whether it is possible to
injure the public, not whether the public is actually being injured. See also Wooten
v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910), where the court said an agreement
might be invalid "if it were shown that this was one of many similar contracts
tending to engross or monopolize any given business, or the sale of any article,
within the territory named." Id. at 46, 68 S.E. at 899.

"118

N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 813 (1896).

,Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way & Co., 169 N.C. 679, 688, 86 S.E. 603, 607

(1915).,
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In Reeves v. Sprague,85 where the action was against a third party
and the covenantor, the third party had bought the inventory of the
covenantor, giving a purchase money mortgage to secure the payment
of the purchase price. The court held it "would not restrain the covenantor from selling of leasing his premises to others to engage in the
business which he has agreed to abstain from carrying on or from selling
to them machinery or supplies needed in embarking in it."' 6 The holding of a mortgage by the covenantor was not deemed a sufficient interest
to violate the covenant. The court seemed to look at whether the covenantor had divested himself of all interest in the subject matter of the
covenant, and, if not, to how to direct his interest and control were in
the competing activities of the third party. The court seemed to look
at the third party to see whether his activities evidenced an alliance with
the covenantor to avoid the effect of the covenant or whether the third
party had intentionally induced the covenantor to breach the covenant.
In Kramer v. Old, 7 where the action was against the covenantor,
the court held "[A] different rule [from that in the Reeves case] must
prevail when it appears that the prohibited party attempts, not to sell
outright to others, but to furnish the machinery or capital, or a portion
of either... in a corporation organized with a view to competition with
the person protected by his contract against such injury."38 In Finch v.
Michael39 the covenantor loaned money to the third party who competed
directly with the covenantee, but the court held the covenantor did not
have sufficient interest in the third party's business to violate his contract with the covenantee. The holding in the Finch case as to the furnishing of capital seems to disregard the language of the court in the
Kramer case forbidding it. However, in Finch the court seems to be
looking at the actual effect of the furnishing of capital to the third party
and not at the motive of the covenantor. The court in Finch seemed to
admit there was a breach of the covenant, but it did not feel there was
a substantial breach present. The court admitted that the covenantor
"might not be acting with due propriety nor with good faith" but it
40
could not see how he had committed any legal wrong.
' 114 N.C. 647, 19 S.E. 707 (1894).

'Finch v. Michael, 167 N.C. 322, 324, 83 S.E. 459, 460 (1914).
'1119
N.C. 1, 25 S.E. 813 (1896).,
8
" Id. at 12, 25 S.E. at 815; cf. King v. Fountain, 126 N.C. 196, 35 S.E. 428
(1900), where the covenanator got his wife to set up a business in' competition
with the covenantee and the court said: "[I]t requires but little scrutiny to look
through these facts and discover who controls the business and enjoys the profits."
3"167 N.C. 322, 83 S.E. 458 (1914).
'oId. at 325, 83 S.E. at 460. But see Baker v. Cordon, 86 N.C. 119 (1882),
where the court said the covenantor had to maintain his "personal separation" from
the business the covenantee was engaged in and could not be "instrumental in inducing others to embark in it." See also Kramer v. Old, 119 N.C. 1, 25 S.E. 813
(1913).
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In Sineath v. Katzis ' the vendor corporation sold all its assets to
the covenantee. The covenantor was president of the vendor corporation and owned ninety-eight percent of its stock. The court said that
the covenantor did not need to have a direct interest in the business sold
to be subject to a validly binding restrictive covenant; he needs only to
be prominent in the business sold. 42 The court seemed to feel that this
would satisfy the requirement that the covenant be incidental to or in
support of another lawful contract, a requirement necessary because the
covenantor must receive a valuable consideration in return for his agreeing to the restraint. The court uses language to the effect that if the
parties intended that the covenant should be incidental to the main transaction,43 though there was no express agreement present, this would be
-satisfactory.
As stated in Sineath, the general rule is that a third party cannot
be enjoined from engaging in the business covered by the covenant or
be otherwise held liable except when he, knowing of the covenant, aids
the covenantor in violating his covenant or receives some benefit from
the violation. In Sineath, after the vendor corporation had sold to the
vendees all its real and personal property, the third party organized a
corporation which competed with the covenantees. The covenantor participated indirectly in its management and in the profits the new corporation made. As a consequence, the court found that the third party as
well as the covenantor had participated in a breach of the contract.
In Sineath the court seems to take the position that the corporation
is not to be enjoined from competing with the covenantee, though the
corporation was organized and supported by the covenantor, unless the
corporation is found to be the alter ego44 of the covenantor. The court
mentioned the fact that the covenantees failed to show who the stockholders were or what interest any particular party had in the new corpo"218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E.2d 611 (1940).
In order to hold an outsider liable for compensatory damages for causing a

42

breach of contract, the following elements are required: (1) that there existed
a valid contract between the third party and the plaintiff; (2) that the outsider
had knowledge of the existence of such a contract; (3) that the outsider intentionally induced the third party not to perform his contract; (4) that the outsider

acted without justification; and (5) that the outsider's action caused the plaintiff
actual damage. The outsider has knowledge of the contract if he knows the facts
which give rise to the plaintiff's contractual right against the third party. He is

subject to liability even though mistaken as to the legal sufficiency of the contract
and the significance thereof and believes there is no contract or that the contract
means something other than what it is judicially held to mean. If the outsider acts
without a sufficient lawful reason then he has acted without justification. Childress
v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
" Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N.C. 755, 12 S.E2d 611 (1940). See also 17 C.J.S.
Contracts § 246 (1939).
"See

(1936).

generally LATrY, S-BSIDIAPIES AND AFFILIATED CoRpoRATIONS 64-65
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ration. For this reason the court seemed to feel that the new corporation
had not been brought within the exception to the general rule.
In summary, the court thus far in its decisions does not seem to give
any substantial weight to the duration of the covenant. However, the
covenantee would seem well advised to avoid a covenant that lasts forever, and to limit the covenant to the lives of the parties involved, since
the court has used language in its decisions which would give it an adequate peg on which to hang any future finding of unreasonable duration.
In respect to the extent of the territory the covenant is to include,
any restriction on the covenantor which is all-encompassing should be
avoided. The covenantee, of course, will want to draw up a contract
that will include the territory presently covered by the covenantee's
business and, at the same time, will include the territory the covenantee
will reasonably need protected in the future. Perhaps one means to
accomplish this is to separate the territory into various segments so that
the court, if it feels the outer limits are unreasonable, can easily enforce
the covenant as to a portion without destroying the entire contract.
The covenantee will have no guide as to whether the contract will be
in violaton of public policy. To say the court looks to the nature of the
business and the needs of the public is nebulous and of little help outside
fact situations like those ruled on in prior cases. Thus, the matter is
largely one of prediction. As a further difficulty, the court does not
always make clear in its decisions whether it looks at the reasonableness
of the covenant at the time the contract was made or at the time the contract is being litigated. Finally, it should be noted that the court does
not seem to consider any one factor of reasonableness alone in arriving
at its decisions.
W. TEOMAs RAY
Landlord and Tenant-Liability of Landlord for Personal
Injuries Caused by His Failure To Repair
In a recent case from the Third Circuit," plaintiff, a social guest in
the home of a tenant, was injured as she left the premises. She sued
the landlord, alleging that, in performing his covenant to make repairs,
he negligently installed a light fixture and that as a consequence of this
improper installation she was injured. The district court gave summary
judgment for the defendant. The circuit court reversed, saying that
under New Jersey law, when the landlord undertakes to make repairs,
he is bound to perform the work in a reasonably careful manner, and for
failure to do so he will be liable in tort to one injured because of his
negligence.
'Krieger

v. Ownership Corp., 270 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 199).

